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Executive summary  
Swiss banking secrecy used to be a quirk of Swiss law that went largely untouched 
until recent times. Recently through high profile, year-long pressure by governments 
the world over, this secrecy, which had shielded account owners from declaring their 
financial assets and thus, taxable income, was partly dismantled. This oddity in Swiss 
law was always a hot button issue for many governments around the world, and lately 
came to the forefront of discussion for change in front of the Swiss government and the 
Swiss public. 
This paper aims to investigate how Swiss banking secrecy came about, and how it has 
evolved to its current reduced form thanks to internal and external actors, and the 
context of an increasingly globalized world. The transformation of attitudes towards 
privacy, financial responsibility and the external world for the Swiss taxpayer and voter 
has inevitably changed the Swiss banking secrecy.  
The actors involved in enacting any changes, namely the Swiss Parliament, the 
Federal Council, economic institutions and the Swiss people, all have their own 
motives, which will be analysed and discussed. It will be shown that cultural shifts and 
current events which at first glance might seem unconnected may have an impact on 
precise financial law.  
Throughout this paper, the aim is to track the increasing trend of total financial 
transparency, and to illustrate how a complex web of actors and events led to this and 
how this relates to Switzerland and the Swiss banking secrecy. It also aims to track the 
domestic opinion of the Swiss voters who, thanks to the Swiss legislative structure, will 
have a direct say on changes made regarding Swiss banking secrecy, for example the 
Initiative Matter.  
Switzerland whose shroud of banking secrecy was previously seen as untouchable, 
now no longer applies for foreign investors, as the automatic exchange of information is 
due to begin. Now the question remains, what is left of the Swiss banking secrecy for 
its domestic taxpayers, and what does its future hold? 
Finally, the conclusion shall outline the purpose of the banking secrecy in the eyes of 
the Swiss taxpayers, and in what way it could obstruct their willingness to financially 
contribute towards the community. In a global trend tending towards transparency, it 
will be explained that taxation of Swiss wealth and derived income will be achieved 
either through an extension of the Swiss withholding tax if the banking secrecy was to 
remain, or through increased tax authority knowledge of the taxpayers’ financial private 
sphere. With these theoretical incomes, the future of the Swiss banking secrecy and on 
a larger scale, the Swiss financial and fiscal systems are in flux, and it is an exciting 
time to be watching.  
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Introduction 
Description of the issue 
In recent times, a discreet small country in the heart of Europe has been put in the spotlight 
of the financial world against its will. This was quite unusual for a reputed financial centre 
which, concerned with its international reputation, had always taken good care of its 
neutrality and marketed an image of a peaceful and prosperous small land. 
The reason for all this unwelcome attention was a financial practices which has made 
Switzerland’s neighbours frustrated for a long time: the banking secrecy. 
In 1934, in a context of upcoming war in Europe, Switzerland enshrined in criminal law a 
discretion that has been an integral part of Swiss banking for centuries. Comparable to the 
professional secrecy widely imposed to lawyers or clergy members, this now legally enforced 
secrecy, deeply ingrained in the Swiss banking tradition, created an investment opportunity 
for foreign investors seeking to avoid investigation from their respective tax authorities.  
But what actually is the Swiss banking secrecy? A confusion must be avoided: in no 
developed country will a banker disclose private information without governmental 
intervention. Therefore, in terms of terminology only, “banking secrecy” could apply to any 
banking institution in the world. What makes the Swiss banking secrecy so special is that it is 
actually a fiscal secrecy. Indeed, the Art. 47 of the “Loi fédérale sur les banques et les 
caisses d’épargne“ (Appendix 1) forbids any professional related to a bank in possession of 
information regarding a client to disclose them without the decision of a penal judge, even to 
the tax authorities. 
Recently, the measures taken by external actors against this hallowed financial tradition 
brought it to an end for foreign investors whom are no longer protected against the 
investigation of their respective tax authorities. With the last international barrier down, only 
the internal banking secrecy remains for the Swiss taxpayer, and the external conflict is now 
beginning within the Swiss borders: what future is there for the banking secrecy for Swiss 
taxpayers? 
The present report aims firstly to bring a comprehensive understanding of this financial 
practice that is the Swiss banking secrecy by retracing its historical path and legal 
development until its current status, and analysing why it is where it is today. In the second 
part, the student will identify the Swiss actors who will play a role towards financial 
transparency in Switzerland and consider their impact in the current political, cultural, and 
economic environment. 
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Brief history  
If the legal story of the Swiss banking secrecy as we know it begins legally in 1934, its 
historical roots can be traced as early as the 17th century with the signature of the Edict of 
Fontainebleau by French King Louis XIV.  
Aiming to unite its people in a single religion, Catholicism, Louis XIV revokes Henri IV’s Edict 
of Nantes in 1685, which granted the Protestants a certain freedom of religion around a 
century earlier. The religious war that was ended by Henry IV, Protestant himself, begun 
again and the members of the elite that were the Protestants were persecuted. As a result, 
around 300’000 Protestants, called Huguenots by the Catholics, began their exodus out of 
France to reach Protestant neighbours, and left the country with a shortage of skilled labour 
(VANNEROT, 2009). 
Crucially, following the Lutheran reform, Geneva had become Protestant in 1536, the same 
year that saw the arrival of Jean Calvin, a French reformer who decided to make Geneva his 
new church’s hub. Calvin quickly became an important political figure, notably by accessing 
the presidency of the influential Company of pastors, by imposing strict laws and legitimised 
a crucial practice that widely impacted Geneva’s financial place: the loan with interest, 
rigorously condemned by the Catholic church. This made Geneva an attractive place for the 
Huguenots. 
Settling down in Geneva, this flock of rich Huguenots gave a new impetus to the town by 
accepting contract loans towards the French king despite the persecution inflicted. This 
rather paradoxical behaviour can be explained by the mutuality of financial interest between 
the two parties. Nevertheless, it is out of question that the French population discovers that 
their King is financing the war against heresy with the help of Protestant funds for the sake of 
the King’s credibility. The two parties therefore agree on an absolute confidentiality and begin 
their financial relationship in the deepest secrecy through the name of Geneva banks 
(VANNEROT, 2009). The Swiss banking secrecy is born. 
Subsequently, from revolutions to wars, Switzerland, neutral since 1815’s Vienna Congress, 
was a place of financial refuge to much of Europe. Switzerland managed to strengthen its 
financial place thanks to the migration of wealth away from foreign tax policy judged too 
restrictive, accompanied by progressive reinforcement of the Swiss banking secrecy (GUEX, 
1999). 
The Swiss banking secrecy’s strongest reinforcement and official year of “birth” is 1934 with 
its anchorage in the new “Loi fédérale sur les banques et les caisses d’épargne”. It is from 
then on legislated by the Art. 47 (Appendix 1). 
The Swiss banking secrecy is now matter of public right and, therefore, the prosecution of 
any related offence falls within the frame of Swiss Penal code and judicial body.  
The reasons for this reinforcement are still unclear and subjected to debate, but the result is 
the same: starting 1934, the violation of the Swiss banking secrecy is a serious felony.  
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Recent development 
Controversial throughout its entire history, Swiss banking secrecy took a hit in the context of 
the 2008 economic crisis which began with the subprime turmoil in the USA. The Internal 
Revenue Service (hereafter, IRS), the US tax authority, found that Swiss banks did not 
comply with the Qualified Intermediary policy, which was a policy put in place in order to 
ensure a tax withholding from foreign financial agents to US nationals’ assets around the 
world, which Swiss banking secrecy ran contrary to.  
March 13th, 2009: first step towards exchange of information 
Finding themselves in times of critical need for liquidity, the members of the G20, gathered in 
November 2008, set as their priority the end of tax evasion and tax competition and went to 
find money abroad in financially attractive countries such as Switzerland. The OECD, is put 
in charge by the G20 of listing the non-compliant member states and separate them in three 
categories from fully compliant to non-compliant according to their tax practice. Switzerland, 
due to its unwillingness to exchange tax information, found itself listed in the middle zone, 
along with other countries who did not fully respect the OECD international financial norms 
(ZAKI, 2010).  
Worried about its image and related trade opportunities, Switzerland made a first step in the 
direction of tax transparency by accepting on March 13th, 2009 the OECD condition to 
renegotiate a dozen double tax treaties to fully apply the Art. 26 of the OECD model of 
double tax treaty (Appendix 2) which was slightly different from Switzerland’s double tax 
treaties as it regulates the matter of exchange of information which is at core of the issue. 
As a preliminary remark, the reader is reminded that a double tax treaty’s primary purpose is 
to avoid any double taxation of any taxpayer (both individual or company) in two contracting 
States. Even though countries are free to define the legal provisions addressed by their 
double tax treaties, these are usually inspired and very similar to the Model Convention 
issued by the OECD (hereafter: MC OECD). Therefore, whenever a doubt remains 
concerning the taxation dispositions of a taxpayer’s income or wealth on the basis of both 
their domestic laws (e.g. if an asset is considered taxable in two countries according to their 
respective law and both countries wish to levy the related taxes), the applicable double tax 
treaty would act as a superior authority above the countries’ internal legislation to ensure that 
the tax is levied in only one state. 
Two aspects of the legal definition of tax infraction under Swiss law as well as the types of 
mutual aid require particular analysis to understand the impact of the Art. 26 and its 
contradiction with the Swiss double tax treaties and financial practice.  
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I: Swiss qualification of tax infractions 
The qualification of tax infraction varies widely between Switzerland and most of the other 
OECD members. The term “tax evasion”, which has been particularly heard during the 
OECD campaign for tax fairness, qualifies two completely different things depending on the 
side of the border. Indeed, according to the OECD’s definition, tax evasion refers to “illegal 
arrangements where liability to tax is hidden or ignored, i.e. the taxpayer pays less tax than 
he is legally obligated to pay by hiding income or information from the tax authorities”1. 
Switzerland, for its part, distinguishes the terms of tax subtraction (in French, soustraction 
d’impôt) and tax fraud (fraude fiscale) which are not considered as crimes of equal level and, 
as such, are not prosecuted by the same legal entities. According to Swiss tax law, a tax 
subtraction crime refers to a simple infraction (e.g. a bank account is not reported in the tax 
return therefore not taxed) prosecuted by the Cantonal tax authorities and reprimanded only 
by a fine, whereas tax fraud refers to the avoidance of tax through the usage of falsified 
documents and is considered a penal crime punishable by imprisonment. 
Those two legal notions find their roots in the Swiss Federal tax law (Loi sur l’Impôt Federal 
Direct), and their distinction is made at the articles 175 for tax subtraction and 186 for tax 
fraud (Appendix 3).  
The term tax evasion also exists in Swiss tax procedure (évasion fiscale). In the view of the 
Swiss tax administration, it is not a violation nor a crime, but it refers to a jurisprudential 
principle through which the authorities invokes an abuse of rights in order to nullify tax 
savings made if the taxpayer clearly uses an economic vehicle and misappropriates its initial 
purpose with the aim to save a significant amount of tax if the operation were accepted by 
the tax authorities2. The Swiss notion of tax evasion is therefore similar to the OECD’s notion 
of tax avoidance, which describes “the arrangement of a taxpayer's affairs that is intended to 
reduce his tax liability and that although the arrangement could be strictly legal it is usually in 
contradiction with the intent of the law it purports to follow”3. 
As outlined above, neither tax subtraction nor tax evasion are prosecuted by Swiss penal 
law, as opposed to tax fraud. Yet, only a penal judge has the authority to lift the banking 
secrecy and force a bank to deliver financial information about its client. It is this distinction 
that allowed foreign taxpayers to deposit assets in Swiss banks and omit to declare these in 
their country of tax residency while being protected by the banking secrecy against any 
exchange of information on this matter as this omission, seen as a penal crime in their 
country, was not a fraud pursuant to Swiss tax law. 
Therefore, no exchange of financial information was feasible according to the second 
paragraph of the Art. 26 MC OECD as it was not obtainable by Swiss tax authorities in 
accordance with Swiss tax law. 
                                               
1
 OECD’s Glossary of tax terms: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm (Accessed on August 
7th, 2016) 
2
 cf. OBERSON p. 56 and ATF 107 lb 322 
3
 OECD’s Glossary of tax terms: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm (Accessed on August 
7th, 2016) 
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II: Types of mutual aid 
Secondly, in the context of international exchange of information, two types of mutual aids 
are distinguished: the so-called “small mutual aid” (petite entraide) and “great mutual aid” 
(entraide au sens large)4. The small mutual aid qualifies the fact of exchanging information in 
order to carry out the provisions of the double tax treaty and therefore avoiding any double 
taxation between two countries, whereas the great mutual aid consists of information 
exchanged in order to apply another states’ domestic law, involving demands from a State 
towards another not only in case of risk of double taxation but also if there is a doubt that an 
asset is not being taxed within its border. 
If Switzerland had already exchanged information with other States in the past on the basis 
of the small mutual aid, the acceptance of the Art. 26 MC OECD as imposed by the G20 and 
the OECD clearly implied that, upon renegotiation of its double tax treaties, Switzerland 
would be required to share information on the basis of the great mutual aid, therefore 
providing financial information to other states, contrary to its internal law on banking secrecy. 
On March 13th, 2009, succumbing to the increased pressure from the G20 and the OECD, 
the Federal Council accepted the conditions applied under Art. 26 MC OECD and marked 
the first breach in the Swiss banking secrecy history. 
Although this event represented an important step towards tax transparency, the giant step 
would be taken only five years later. 
Automatic exchange of information 
On May 6th, 2014, the new global standard concerning the automatic exchange of tax 
information (hereafter, EAR) on an international level was approved by the OECD Council5. 
So far, nothing surprising since the organisation has been seeking international financial 
transparency to fight tax evasion for the past decades with the active support of the 
G7/G8/G20. What came as a surprise to the Swiss financial sector was the Federal Council’s 
approval on October 8th, 2014 to negotiate the terms of an automatic exchange of 
information6, to which it was strongly opposed in the past, as outlined above. 
Only three weeks later, at the plenary session of the Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, Switzerland, along with around hundred States 
including all the important financial centres pledged to introduce the so-called Common 
Reporting Standard (CRS) to aim for a first exchange of information in 2018 
(SCHELLENBERG WITTMER SA, 2015).  
                                               
4
 In accordance with the definition of the Guidelines of the Federal Office of Justice in matter of 
International Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters:  
http://www.rhf.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/rhf.Par.0086.File.tmp/wegl-str-f-2009.pdf (Accessed on 
August 7th, 2016 
5
 Declaration on Automatic Exchange of Information in Tax Matters : http://www.oecd.org/tax/MCM-
2014-Declaration-Tax.pdf (Accessed on August 7th, 2016) 
6
 Federal Council’s communication dated January 20
th
, 2016 : 
https://www.admin.ch/gov/fr/accueil/documentation/communiques/communiques-conseil-federal.msg-
id-60367.html (Accessed on August 7th, 2016) 
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The EAR, once entered in force, will replace the withholding tax requested within the Bilateral 
Agreements with the EU on the taxation of savings income7 and will render the Rubik 
agreement contracted with Austria and the United-Kingdom redundant (The taxation of 
savings income and Rubik agreements were anonymous withholding tax systems aiming to 
ensure a fair allocation of the tax levied by Swiss banks between Switzerland and the 
contracting states whilst keeping the anonymity of the Swiss banks’ clients). It will be applied 
separately from the FATCA agreement (system put in place by the IRS to ensure the 
appropriate taxation of US citizens or green card holders in the USA on their assets abroad) 
(HILDEBRANDT & SCHAER, 2016). 
Where does Switzerland stand? 
In summary, the Swiss banking secrecy that played an important role in the development of 
Switzerland as a strong financial hub will come to an end for foreign taxpayers with the first 
automatic exchange of information in 2018. The Federal Council’s intention to comply with 
international tax standards already sent a strong message to foreign investors who, from 
then on, lose the tax incentive linked to the discretion offered by Swiss banks a short while 
ago. If the birth of the Swiss banking secrecy was narrated earlier in the present report, it 
seems that the story is approaching its end. 
The recent developments have shown a clear trend evolving towards international financial 
transparency. However, the international pressure has not brought the banking secrecy to its 
end for Swiss taxpayers whom still have the opportunity to benefit the banks’ discretion. Now 
that the G20 and OECD reached their objective, the banking secrecy for Swiss taxpayers is 
creating the debate amongst Swiss actors who will define the future of this Swiss practice. 
The second part of this report aims to identify the principal actors who will play a role in the 
internal confrontation which will set the stage of the future marketplace, and to evaluate their 
influence based on the context in which they operate. 
  
                                               
7
 Taxation of savings / AEI official statement : https://www.eda.admin.ch/dea/fr/home/bilaterale-
abkommen/ueberblick/bilaterale-abkommen-2/zinsbesteuerung.html (Accessed on August 7th, 2016)  
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Analysis 
If the detractors of the Swiss banking secrecy were mostly based in the EU, the matter is 
also controversial within Switzerland and some Swiss actors also demonstrated a favourable 
view towards the achievement of financial transparency. Now that Switzerland conceded the 
exchange of information according to the OECD’s transparency policy, the next 
developments are going to take place where the last bastions of the banking secrecy remain, 
thus internally. 
The upcoming debates take place in the context of a complex economic and political 
environment. The Swiss Confederation is a Federal State as per the adoption of the first 
Federal Constitution in 1848, composed of twenty-six Cantons which are sovereigns of their 
very own legal systems for any matter that does not fall within the frame of the Constitution. 
In this system, a wide range of economic and politic actors are asked to take side and play a 
crucial role in the evolution of the Swiss legal framework in many domains. 
The study of the actors described below does not purport to be exhaustive, but aims at 
interpreting the role that will be endorsed by the principal players from a political and 
economic point of view. 
Swiss banking secrecy: the actors 
Parliament 
In Switzerland, the Federal Assembly or Parliament embodies the Supreme Authority 
(subjected to the constitutional rights of citizens) and the Legislative power. It is comprised of 
two chambers with equal power, the National Council and the Council of States, respectively 
composed of two hundred members representing the citizens and forty-six members 
representing the cantons elected every four years. The number of National Council’s seats is 
distributed according to each Canton’s population and therefore vary with Switzerland’s 
demographics, whereas the Council of States’ seats are fixed at two by Canton (one for each 
of the six half-Cantons). The Parliament deliberates concerning any modifications of the 
Federal Constitution and Federal laws, the use of the Federal budget, and elects and 
monitors the Federal Council’s activities (Conseil fédéral, 2016). Among the Parliament’s 
instruments, it has the power to direct the Federal Council to propose a project of law or take 
legal measures through a so-called parliamentary motion. For a motion to be binding, it 
needs to be adopted by both chambers (ARBEX & BOILLAT, 2015). 
Throughout the years, motions arose both from the right and the left parties in the Parliament 
with the defence or the abolition of the banking secrecy as their primary purpose for various 
reasons that will be expanded upon. 
Parliamentary motions 
On June 26th, 1998, Christian Grobet, left-wing member of the National Council introduces a 
parliamentary motion aiming at complementing the Swiss Penal Code, proposing to consider 
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direct tax subtraction as a justifying motive to lift the banking secrecy8. This political 
manoeuvre, ambitious for its time, yet only aimed at making the subtraction of an income of 
CHF 10’000 and above a penal crime, which seems like a rather generous margin of 
freedom for what could reasonably assimilated to a simple omission. The motion argued that 
a subtraction of an income higher than CHF 10’000 was a clear attempt to avoid direct tax, 
and that the banking secrecy allowed an inequality of the taxpayers before the law, 
especially in times of economic downturn where dishonest taxpayers should not be given the 
possibility to not contribute towards the community while using its benefits (public services). 
It also invoked the fact that most of the EU, Switzerland’s first business partner, already 
assimilated tax subtraction with tax fraud, and that Switzerland could not afford to lose 
credibility on this matter, knowing that the applicable law prevented any exchange of banking 
information of this kind which was already a source of dispute. 
In response, the Federal Council, although agreeing with the principle, noted that setting a 
certain amount could not sufficiently assess the taxpayer’s intent and/or guilt for what could 
lead to imprisonment, which makes the motion difficult to carry containing a specific amount 
since it reduced the tribunal’s flexibility. Keen to empower the tax administrations to lift the 
banking secrecy to apply the tax law but reluctant to integrate a specific amount in the penal 
code, the Federal Council proposed to transform the motion into a postulate9. 
On September 23rd, 1999, State Councillor Willy Loretan, along with right-wing parties, 
presented a motion whose goal was to reduce the power of action of the Federal tax 
authority’s Division Penal Affairs and Investigation which is in charge of investigating serious 
tax crimes and proceeding with appropriate legal actions according to the art. 190 to 195 of 
the Federal law on the Federal direct tax10. This motion argued that the powers allocated to 
this division were overreaching and not precise enough, as tax officers were given the right 
to search taxpayers’ domicile in case of doubt of tax fraud11.  
In its response, the Federal Council denied Mr. Loretan’s assumption, reminding him of the 
efficiency with which the division, between 1989 and 1999 had successfully intervened to 
recover 80.5 million CHF of tax income distributed between the Confederation and the 
Cantons, showing how significant the tax amounts at stake were and supporting the idea that 
only serious crimes were prosecuted. In the light of these facts, the Federal Council 
proposed to reject the motion and was followed by the Council of States. 
                                               
8
 Motion n°98.3352 : Pénalisation de la soustraction d’impôt :  
https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=19983352 (Accessed on 
August 7
th
, 2016) 
9
 A postulate mandates the Federal Council to examine and report on whether to submit a bill to the 
Federal Assembly or to take a measure 
10
 LIFD RS 642.11 : https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19900329/index.html 
(Accessed on August 7
th
, 2016) 
11
 Motion n°99.3476 : Mesures spéciales d’enquête (LIFD). Garanties de l’Etat de droit : 
https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=19993476 (Accessed on 
August 7
th
, 2016) 
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On November 28th, 2002, Pierre Tillsmanns, left-wing National Councillor, proposed a motion 
targeting the abolition of the Swiss banking secrecy12. The ratification of the motion would 
fundamentally alter the Swiss law and allow the tax administration to systematically 
prosecute violations of the Swiss tax law. Mr. Tillsmanns noted that if Switzerland had 
developed a massive set of weapons against money laundering, its system presents 
significant deficiencies, as he claims that the banking secrecy allows substantial amounts of 
dirty money to be peacefully hidden not only from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
but also to the world’s tax authorities, therefore depriving many countries of legitimate tax 
revenues, including Switzerland. Mr. Tillsmanns takes offence of his country which, invoking 
the private sphere, disadvantages its honest taxpayers in favour of the banking industry. He 
foresaw that if Switzerland did not dismantle it itself and start cooperating towards an 
automatic exchange of information, EU countries would eventually impose it.  
The Federal Council proposed to the Parliament to reject the motion, stating that the current 
law already allowed the tracing of the source of funds placed in Swiss banks preventing 
money derived from illegal activities to be accepted within the border. Furthermore, it stated 
that the Swiss withholding tax was applied to all Swiss-sourced interest/dividends, and that in 
order to get it refunded, Swiss or foreign citizens had to prove that the income had been 
declared to their respective tax authorities for taxation, hence motivating tax honesty. It is 
important to note that the Federal Council had no interest for this motion to carry. Indeed, on 
June 2002, it had opened with the EU the negotiation of the Bilateral II which contained, 
among others, the agreement on the taxation of savings income which would provide the 
terms for an anonymous transfer of the withholding tax withheld by Swiss banks to the tax 
authorities of their clients’ country of residency, enabling the rightful taxation while the 
banking secrecy remained, and the legal provisions of the motion would obstruct the 
procedure of negotiation with the EU. 
On March 21st, 2003, left-wing National Councillor Franziska Teuscher proposed to expand 
the power of the Division Penal Affairs and Investigation and to create an independent 
Division that would not need the approval of the Chief of the Federal Department of Finance 
(therefore, the Federal Councilor) to launch an investigation, so that Switzerland may be able 
to prosecute tax offenses in all domains (indirect and direct tax)13. Mrs. Teuscher, while 
highlighting the importance of the Division, was concerned that the Cantonal tax authorities 
did not make use of it in case of doubt of serious tax fraud, as an investigation from the 
Division requires, as mentioned, the express agreement of the Chief of the competent 
Department, which renders the administration quite heavy. Also, she stated that the power to 
prosecute tax fraud should fall within the responsibility of the Confederation and not the 
Cantonal tax authorities given their proximity to their taxpayers. 
The Federal Council answered that having the Confederation in charge of levying direct 
taxes would require a deep change in the constitutional law in place and a complete 
                                               
12
 Motion n°02.3662 : Le secret bancaire : un obstacle : https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-
curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20023662 (Accessed on August 7th, 2016) 
13
 Motion n°03.3169 : Lutter efficacement contre la fraude fiscale : 
https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20033169 (Accessed on 
August 7th, 2016) 
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rearrangement of the current political system. Therefore, it did not agree with the reallocation 
of this power, but did recommend to transform the motion into a postulate to assess ways to 
improve the perception of direct taxes and prosecution of fraud. 
On March 18th, 2009, in response to the Federal Council’s decision dated March 13th, 2009 to 
accept the art. 26 of the MC OCDE, right-wing National Councillor Pirmin Bischof proposed a 
motion to enable Switzerland to negotiate the terms of the exchange of financial information 
with USA and UK14 since these countries (or parts of them) pushed against Switzerland’s 
banking secrecy while protecting their own similar practice15. The Federal Council, whilst 
aware of the developments in this field, considered that legal basis on this matter were 
unnecessary at this stage, and proposed to reject the motion. 
On September 24th, 2009, States Councillor Simonetta Sommaruga (who joined the Federal 
Council in September 2010 where she still sits as of today) introduced a motion in order for 
Cantonal tax authorities to be given the same right to receive financial information from third 
parties since this right was conceded on March 13th the same year to Foreign tax 
administrations. She recalled that this right was never given to Cantonal tax authorities in the 
past as it was considered that the financial benefit obtained by attracting foreign investors in 
Swiss banks was more favourable than the related tax revenues, which she argued was no 
longer applicable given the recent changes16.  
The Federal Council acknowledged the fact that the motions aims to change the element of 
tax secrecy and not the general banking secrecy. However, it considered that the elements in 
place to fight tax fraud were sufficient and proposed to reject the motion, stating that a good 
relationship between the taxpayers and the tax authorities was more important to ensure tax 
honesty than having access to their financial information. The Federal Council’s decision can 
be explained by the fact that, when accepting to deliver financial information to foreign tax 
authorities, it clearly stated that the banking secrecy would remain unchanged for Swiss 
taxpayers17. Therefore, the rejection of the motion proposed was a political decision to avoid 
losing credibility in the eyes of the taxpayers. 
On June 18th, 2010, following the announcement in March 2010 that FATCA would oblige 
non-US banks to closely work with the IRS and provide financial information regarding their 
US clients, right-wing National Councillor Hans Kaufmann proposed a motion asking the 
Federal Council to deliver an official declaration to the US government stating that Swiss 
banks would not provide any financial information outside the frame of the mutual assistance 
                                               
14
 Motion n°09.3147 : Secret bancaire. Lutter à armes égales :  
https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20093147 (Accessed on 
August 7th, 2016) 
15
The Delaware, Nevada and Montana in the USA, and The British Virgin Islands, British overseas 
territory, maintain a similar banking secrecy towards the world’s tax authorities 
16
 Motion n°09.3897 : Compétences identiques pour les autorités fiscales cantonales et étrangères : 
https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20093897 (Accessed on 
August 7th, 2016) 
17
 Federal Department of Finance’s communication dated September 24
th
, 2009 : 
https://www.efd.admin.ch/efd/fr/home/dokumentation/nsb-news_list.msg-id-29205.html (Accessed on 
August 11th, 2016) 
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legal procedures in place18. Since FATCA would be put in place with the express agreement 
of the client, The Federal Council did not consider that the banking secrecy was lifted and 
proposed to reject the motion. 
On September 27th, 2013, socialist National Councillor Margret Kiener Nellen introduced a 
motion proposing to set up a legal precedent to enable the Federal tax authority to establish 
statistics regarding the direct tax infractions in Switzerland, which in practice would be 
difficult to investigate due to the obvious reasons related to the banking secrecy, and the 
liberty of the Cantonal tax authorities to inform, or not, the Federal tax authorities about their 
administrative decisions19. She argued that transparency is a key element of democracy. The 
Federal Council, without comment, proposed to accept it. 
Identifiable trends 
The analysis of the motions proposed by the Parliament since 1998 demonstrates that 
political trends remain constant: 
I. The Federal Department of Finance is, as could be expected, systematically the 
competent department to study the motions and advise the Federal Council; 
II. The Federal Council’s balance, following the Federal Department of Finance’s 
positions, is generally in favour of the reduction of tax secrecy; 
III. International cooperation and credibility in the eyes of the economic partners (notably 
the EU) has always been a serious topic; 
IV. The fight consists of two sides, right-wing parties willing to maintain and/or reinforce 
the banking secrecy invoking the private sphere and left-wing parties willing to reduce 
it and/or suppress it invoking the equality of the taxpayers and the potential tax 
revenues. 
With regards to this last point, an indication of the future direction that might be followed 
during the next Parliamentary mandate can be derived by having a look at the last election 
results, during which the right-wing parties strengthened their position at the expense of the 
left-wing parties, notably the green parties (DUC-QUANG, 2015). It can be expected that the 
amount of motions arising in favour of the reinforcement of the banking secrecy will increase, 
and that it will be more difficult for left-wing parties to pass motions on this matter with the 
opposition of the majority. 
  
                                               
18
 Motion n°10.3560: Suppression du secret bancaire suisse par la loi américaine : 
https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20103560 (Accessed on 
August 7th, 2016) 
19
 Motion n°13.3959: La Suisse doit enfin disposer d’une statistique des infractions fiscales : 
https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20133959 (Accessed on 
August 7th, 2016) 
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Federal Council  
The Federal Council is Switzerland’s Executive organ. It represents Switzerland 
internationally. Each of its seven members is head of a Federal Department. In the legislative 
process, it is responsible for drafting laws and reviewing projects and popular initiatives to be 
submitted to the Legislative power.  
Beyond its regular standpoints on parliamentary motions as studied above and its 
fundamental decisions dated March 13th, 2009 and October 8th, 2014 going in the direction of 
the reduction of the banking secrecy, two major decisions of the Federal Council show its 
general opinion on the matter: 
As far back as 1981, the Federal Council signed the Additional Protocol to the European 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters as proposed by the Council of Europe. 
This protocol had the purpose of extending mutual assistance between signatory members, 
notably in matter of tax infractions. The Federal Council however signed it with a comment 
similar to that present in Switzerland’s double tax treaties on the Art. 26 MC OCDE article 
before March 13th, 2009, in the sense that tax information would be exchanged only if the 
infraction constituted a fraud as provided by Swiss tax law20. In its message dated August 
31st, 198321, the Federal Council invited the Parliament to ratify the protocol with this 
provision. However, both Chambers categorically refused to ratify the protocol without 
eliminating any provision of mutual aid in case of any tax matter. Meanwhile, 43 countries 
(members or non-members of the Council of Europe) ratified the protocol, whereas 
Switzerland is the only country that has signed it without ratifying it, and still hasn’t as of 
today22. This example shows an early case of disagreement between the Federal Council 
and the Parliament on the subject of international assistance in tax matters. 
In 2013, the Federal Council proposed a revision of the penal law in tax matters which would 
unify the process in place for direct tax (income and wealth tax) and indirect tax (value added 
tax, withholding tax, and stamp duty) and therefore revolutionise the Swiss qualification of tax 
infractions, extending the possibility of Cantonal tax administrations to access Swiss 
taxpayers banking data in case of direct tax subtraction23. 
                                               
20
 Reservation made [by Switzerland] at the time of signature, on 17 November 1981 - Or. Fr. : 
“In accordance with the provisions of Article 8.2a, Switzerland reserves the right to accept Chapter I of 
the Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters only to 
the extent that the fiscal offence constitutes a fraud with regard to taxes.” 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/099/declarations?p_auth=S1L8nFNc&desktop=false (Accessed on August 7
th
, 
2016) 
21
 FF 1983 IV 129: http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.do?id=10103867 
(Accessed on August 7
th
, 2016) 
22
 Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 099, status as of July 23th, 2016: 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/search-on-treaties/-
/conventions/treaty/099/signatures?p_auth=itDlkL1N (Accessed on August 7th, 2016) 
23
 Standpoint on the revision of the penal law in tax matters: 
https://www.efd.admin.ch/efd/fr/home/themen/impots/steuern-national/revision-du-droit-penal-fiscal/fb-
revision_steuerstrafrecht.html (Accessed on August 7th, 2016) 
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As seen previously, tax subtraction regarding direct taxes is not regarded as a constituent 
part of a fraud, therefore prosecuted only by the Cantonal tax administrations which do not 
have the necessary means to investigate penal infractions. Their power is, as such, limited to 
the taxpayer’s obligation to collaborate with them, and they cannot request information 
directly from the bank. Ironically, the same cannot be said for indirect tax, since a subtraction 
doubt is a sufficient motive to open a penal procedure and request the lifting of the banking 
secrecy, therefore offering a total transparency to the tax administrations and allowing them 
to perceive the duty as defined by the law in force. 
By suggesting that the Legislative power should review the penal law in tax matters to allow 
direct taxation to be applied consistently between direct and indirect taxes, the Federal 
Council has taken a clear position with regards to the bank opacity granted to Swiss 
taxpayers in case of simple tax infractions and wishes to give the Cantonal tax 
administrations the right to lift the banking secrecy not only in case of serious direct tax 
infractions but also in case of doubt of subtraction. 
In this context, facing the controversial feedback received during the consultation procedure 
which indicated that it had few chances to pass, the Federal Council decided in November 
2015 to postpone the project of revision. It is important to note that the word postpone 
(“reporter” in French) is specifically used by the Federal Council24, implying that it intends to 
put the matter back on the table as soon as it considers that its chance of success are 
stronger (more favourable political environment). 
In addition to the revision of the penal law in tax matters to unify the direct and indirect taxes’ 
procedure, the Federal Council has another project: the redesign of the withholding tax law25. 
Indeed, it intends to balance the fundamental principle of the debtor agent (i.e. the source of 
the income) to the paying agent (i.e. the bank), implying that the 35% withholding tax would 
no longer only be withheld from Swiss-sourced investment income but to any other type of 
investment income received through banks, significantly extending the scope of it while 
maintaining the banking secrecy in its actual form.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
24
 Communication dated November 4
th
, 2015: Le Conseil fédéral reporte la révision du droit pénal en 
matière fiscale : https://www.admin.ch/gov/fr/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-
59336.html (Accessed on August 7th, 2016) 
25 
Comunication dated December 17th, 2014 : Impôt anticipé: le Conseil fédéral lance une réforme 
visant à renforcer le marché des capitaux : 
https://www.admin.ch/gov/fr/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-55731.html (Accessed on 
August 11th, 2016)  
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People 
A particularity of the democratic system in Switzerland lies in the fact that the people hold 
both semi-direct and direct democratic power. Indeed, they have both the power to elect the 
Parliament, and the ability to propose changes in the Constitution through popular initiatives, 
and to invalidate Federal laws through referendums. 
Initiative Matter 
In June 2013, in quick response to the Federal Council’s project in May 2013 to revise the 
penal law in tax matters to unify the process in place for direct and indirect taxes and, 
therefore, extend the power of the tax administrations vis-à-vis the taxpayers’ financial 
assets, the initiative “Oui à la protection de la sphère privée” was launched by right-wing 
parties26, aiming to reduce the obligation of third parties to comply with the tax authorities and 
to anchor the banking secrecy in the Federal Constitution. The so-called “Initiative Matter” 
(by the name of its instigator) is not the first of its kind: two initiatives already tried to amend 
the Constitution on this matter:  
Indeed, on May 20th, 1984, the people were asked to go to the polls to vote on an initiative 
against the banking secrecy launched by the socialist party27, and rejected it by 73%28, 
showing the importance given by the population to the banking secrecy back then. 
On March 31st, 2009, the far right party Lega dei Ticinesi launched an initiative contradicting 
the Federal Council's decision dated March 13th, 2009 in order to anchor the banking secrecy 
in the Constitution and therefore prevent any exchange of information on the basis of a tax 
subtraction29. The people did not have the opportunity of expressing themselves as the 
instigators failed to gather the required number of signatures within the legal deadline 
(i.e. 100’000 signatures within 18 months)30. 
In the specific case of the Initiative Matter, the initiators succeeded to gather and deliver 
117’531 valid signatures to the Federal Chancellery on October 23rd, 201431. The Federal 
Department of Finance, competent organ for the analysis of the initiative’s content, prepared 
the Federal Council’s message to the Parliament, in which it recommended to reject the 
initiative without opposing a counter-project32.  
Indeed, the Federal Council considers that the initiative’s content goes largely beyond a 
simple inscription of the banking secrecy in the Constitution which could harm the application 
of taxation, and that the protection of the private sphere granted to the citizen by the current 
                                               
26
 Complete text : https://www.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/vi/vis445t.html (Accessed on August 7th, 2016) 
27
 In French : « Contre l’abus du secret bancaire et de la puissance des banques » 
28
 FF 1984 II 1019 : https://www.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/va/19840520/index.html (Accessed on August 7th, 
2016) 
29
 In French : « Défendons la Suisse, inscrivons le secret bancaire dans la Constitution fédérale 
30
 FF 2010 6051 : https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-gazette/2010/6051.pdf (Accessed on August 
7th, 2016) 
31
 FF 2014 8473 : https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-gazette/2014/8473.pdf (Accessed on August 
7th, 2016) 
32
 FF 2015 6429 : https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-gazette/2015/6429.pdf (Accessed on August 
7th, 2016) 
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legal basis was sufficient. Also, the initiative goes against the current international political 
impetus which goes in the direction of transparency. 
The Parliament’s recommendation is not yet known as the project is currently being 
discussed between the two Chambers. According to the deadline provided by the law, it has 
until March 25th, 2017 to adopt a recommendation, and until March 25th, 2018 if it decides to 
oppose a counter-project. Based on experience, it is standard procedure that the people are 
asked to vote around six months following the adoption of the Parliament’s recommendation. 
Since the Parliament’s negotiations are still in progress, it is difficult to assess the chance of 
the initiative to reach a successful conclusion. The initiative is rejected by the interested 
parties such as the Cantonal finance directors even if they are not willing to establish a 
systematic exchange of information between financial institution and tax authorities33, or the 
association Swissbanking which, in its standpoint with regards to the initiative34, considers 
that the application of the initiative would make it too easy to subtract taxable revenues. 
From a statistical point of view only, considering that 146 initiatives have been launched 
since September 22nd, 2002, that 49 of them made it to the voting process, and that 8 were 
accepted by the people, it can be estimated from a statistical perspective that any initiative 
only has a 5.47% rate of success in the polls. Indeed, only 22 initiatives were accepted by 
the people since the Constitution of 184835. 
Should the Initiative Matter be accepted, it would fundamentally anchor the banking secrecy 
in the Constitution making it very difficult for tax administrations to prosecute simple tax 
infractions. In case it is refused however, it would certainly not represent the Swiss banking 
secrecy’s end in the short term, but would give an idea about its support from the voters. 
Economic institutions 
In Switzerland, many lobbies, active in many areas, abound the market place. Beyond 
promoting and defending their group’s interest, they are part of the legislative process in 
Switzerland as there are invited to provide advices in times of consultation procedure 
(MOMBELLI, 2013). 
During the consultation procedure of the Federal Council’s project to revise the penal law in 
tax matters, many participants, notably Switzerland’s biggest lobbies Swissbanking and 
economiesuisse, rejected the revision project and proposed instead to wait for the 
establishment of the EAR to reopen the discussion on the Swiss banking secrecy. They 
                                               
33
 Communication dated September 28
th
, 2015:  
http://www.fdk-cdf.ch/-
/media/FDK_CDF/Dokumente/Allgemein/150928_vi_ps_mm_fdk_def_f.pdf?la=fr-CH  
(Accessed on July 13
th
, 2016) 
34
 SwissBanking standpoint dated September 25th, 2014 : 
http://www.swissbanking.org/en/stellungnahme-20140925.htm (Accessed on August 7th, 2016) 
35
 Cf : https://www.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/vi/vis_2_2_5_8.html (Accessed on August 10th, 2016) 
 
 
 
The future of the banking secrecy for Swiss taxpayers in the light of the evolution of the 
international financial standards 
 
Alix PEETERS  16 
supported the idea of the introduction of a similar system within the border36 which indicates 
the most influential economic actors’ position on this matter. 
Beyond their opinion in consultation procedures, it is known that lobbies financially contribute 
towards certain members of the Parliament’s Chambers. The Parliamentarians being only 
part-time politicians, they maintain a professional activity independent from their government 
obligations. They therefore derive their compensation mainly from their professional activity, 
and from the contributions received from lobbies if they are willing to defend their cause 
(BUCHS, 2011). This practice, legal in Switzerland, influences the political direction taken by 
the Parliament based on the interest of the lobbies (MOMBELLI, 2013). In this context, it is 
feasible, knowing the standpoint of Swissbanking and economiesuisse with regards to the 
banking secrecy, that some parliamentarians, even from right-wing parties, might be 
interested to support the reduction of the banking secrecy depending on their relationship 
with the interested actors.  
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 Communication dated June 24th, 2015 : Le Conseil fédéral reporte la refonte de l’impôt anticipé : 
https://www.admin.ch/gov/fr/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-57815.html (Accessed on 
August 7th, 2016) 
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International and National environment 
The role that each actor will play in future developments to come is yet to be established, as 
their impact will closely depend on the general context in which the action is taken. Factors 
such as political reasoning, financial interests, cultural aspects and others may come into 
play, and could tilt the balance either way. The following part aims to place the above-studied 
actors in perspective of the global context in which they act in order to weight to what extend 
each one might influence the decision process.  
General political context 
A major turning point for the European Union was decided by the British people via popular 
referendum on June 23rd, 2016. Better known as the BREXIT, this historical referendum 
marks the first time a member state ever chose to leave the EU, and sends a strong 
message of change in the political climate in Europe which had a resonating effect on pro-
Europe groups who fear an upcoming chain reaction of departures from the member states 
(SCHRIEBERG, 2016). 
This development, whose pro-campaign was led by conservative parties, is the result of a 
radical right-wing rise not only in the UK but among the European countries for these last 30 
years. This was a reflection of a primarily lower-middle class electorate, but included a 
growing part of the middle class, due in part to a growing alienation with an increasingly 
global economy and society. In addition, the perceived undemocratic nature of the European 
Union and wishes of a more sovereign nation informed their decision, as well as heightened 
fear amid increased immigration and an increased awareness of recent international 
developments. This was successfully levied by populist/radical parties to develop what is 
now known as “Europhobia” or “Euroscepticism” (CAMUS, 2014). 
In this context, taking the case of Austria, the Euro-separatist candidate of the Freedom 
Party of Austria (FPÖ) Norbert Hofer might be elected, and would almost certainly demand 
an Austrian referendum similar to that of the UK. Austria is just an example among many 
political parties which gain popularity and pledge for separation (either for their country from 
the EU, or for a region from a country), such as the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für 
Deutschland) in Germany, the National Front (Front national) in France, the North League 
(Lega Nord) in Italy, the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet) in Norway, the Party for Freedom 
(Partij voor de Vrijheid) in the Netherlands or the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) in 
Denmark (MEUNIER, 2016). Switzerland too has seen growth in popularity of right-wing 
parties, which advocate for Switzerland not to enter the EU but to maintain close economic 
relationship with its neighbours via the negotiation of Bilateral Agreements.  
The above-mentioned populist/radical parties active in European governmental processes or 
influencing it share specific aspects of their speeches. Indeed, the current geo-political 
context changed the fundamental arguments of most of the right-wing parties from their 
perception of the failure of the traditional economical institutions, to the fear of terrorism and 
migration issues, as these fields appeared amongst the five most prioritized subjects by EU 
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citizens in terms of perceived needed supplementary interventions of the EU, as outlined by 
the European Parliament’s last survey in July 201637: 
 Fight against terrorism (82% of respondents); 
 Issue of migration (74% of respondents); and 
 Protection of external borders (71% of respondents). 
Swiss voters have shown similar trends when asked about their principal concerns, as the 
increased immigration, and the influx of refugees came respectively first and fourth of their 
main worries for the future38.  
Understanding to what extent these themes were sensitive in the eyes of the voters, right-
wing parties addressed the related issues in their political speeches and initiated their rapid 
rise to EU member states’ governments which was correspondingly reflected in Switzerland’s 
Parliament as seen previously (DUC-QUANG, 2015). 
Such a political context, along with rising military instability in the Middle-East and around 
Europe (especially in relation with the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in 
March 2014 or the attempt of coup d’état in Turkey in July 2016) gives strength to 
radical/populist parties which underline the views as stated in the above-mentioned survey 
that not enough was being done in the fight against terrorism, and advocate in favour of strict 
border controls. 
In light of the above, it seems unlikely that the crisis currently affecting the political directions 
taken by the EU and Switzerland will be settled in the near future, and it is not outside the 
realms of possibility that the Swiss Parliament’s structure will once again shift in favour of the 
right-wing parties in the 2019 elections. If Swiss citizens vote in their direction in the hope of 
addressing a migration problem, for example, by voting for specific right-wing parties, they 
would give strength to a platform of political programs involving, among others, the Swiss 
banking secrecy. Thus, they might determine the future position of the Swiss Parliament until 
2023 (the next election) regarding the banking secrecy’s protection or reduction, even if their 
vote was cast with different intent, with no interest or knowledge of this issue in the first 
place. This outlines that, in the current political system, a vote against increased immigration 
may transform and determine the future of the Swiss financial sector, and have impact on the 
banking secrecy. 
 
 
                                               
37
 Eurobarometer of the European Parliament, 85.1: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/20160623PVL00111/Europeans-in-2016-Perceptions-and-
expectations-fight-against-terrorism-and-radicalisation (Accessed on August 7th, 2016) 
38
 Credit Suisse – Worry Barometer 2015:  
http://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/index.cfm?fileid=9F4940A3-FB35-F300-
FC08DE83EB1895AF (Accessed on August 7
th
, 2016) 
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Transparency 
Origin of consumer products, usage of funds, friends’ locations and habits, celebrities’ private 
lives, the list goes on. On all levels, and not only in the financial industry, from individuals to 
states and including companies, transparency is becoming increasingly more prevalent, and 
the access to information only increases with the increasing rise of data harvesting practiced 
by technological companies and world governments (REY, 2012). In a context of 
international cooperation and trade, all players are requested to display increasing 
information about their internal and external activities Following this trend, the Swiss tax 
system is slowly but surely evolving towards a criminalisation of the tax subtraction which 
was, not long ago, considered as a socially accepted “gentleman” crime, as outlined by 
Xavier Oberson, Professor of tax law in the Geneva Faculty of Law (GARESSUS, 2015). 
What is transparency? With regards to business conduct, the origin of this term which has 
been widely used during the course of this report dates back as far as the creation of the rule 
of law, which brings a right to the citizen to place responsibility upon political leaders, which 
is not feasible in absence of transparency, allowing one to be aware of the other party’s 
actions. Delegating responsibility implies the need for an access to information and a right to 
control. Thereupon, it is both these rights which represent the crucial pillars to transparency. 
In this respect, the term transparency was mainly referring to the obligation that the State 
had towards the citizen, rather than the opposite (BAUME, 2011). 
At present times, the need for transparency is experienced as an increasing information 
sharing, which can be harmful if not controlled. On the company level for example, any 
increasing number of businesses have their employees share common areas in which no 
walls may interfere in the business conduct. Open space offices are known to foster 
communication and promote collaboration to achieve efficiency and innovation. However, 
their performance is insured provided that they are accompanied with boundaries 
(BELANGER, 2014). Indeed, in a scenario where information circulates without rules, where 
anything is observable by anyone, one might only communicate secondary importance 
information. This phenomenon is referred to as the “transparency trap” (BERNSTEIN, 2014). 
The willingness of the European people to move towards a transparent financial culture was 
already clearly highlighted in 2010 by an European Parliament’s survey39 which set as the 
highest importance to reform the global financial market by implementing tougher rules on 
tax havens (88% of respondents) and increase transparency of financial markets (87% of 
respondents). These figures show how much importance EU citizens place on transparency 
and tax fairness. With regards to the eagerness for tougher rules on tax havens, it is worth 
noting that, at this time, Switzerland was still assimilated as a tax haven as per the OECD’s 
grey list (ZAKI, 2010). In this respect, the EU citizens showed that their opinion had not 
changed in the latest European Parliament’s survey as the fight against tax fraud comes third 
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 Eurobarometer of the European Parliament, 74 : 
(http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_publ_en.pdf) 
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in their priorities after terrorism and unemployment issues (75% of respondents overall)40. 
This willingness for transparency or fight against tax fraud did not seem to be as important 
for Swiss people, as it did not appear among the concerns of the surveyed sample41. 
Fortunately for Switzerland, the mainstream media’s attention has been focused on other 
countries recently. Indeed, the secret arrangements between multinationals and the 
Luxembourg tax authorities (LuxLeaks) and the Panama Papers scandals (BARRINGTON, 
2016) directed the focus onto other territories considered as tax havens, and highlighted a 
serious lack of transparency in important financial markets despite many entities’ efforts, 
such as the FATF, the OECD and its Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of 
Information for Tax Purposes, which are actively seeking to impose transparency. 
As studied previously in the report, the Federal Council has long expressed to the Parliament 
and to the people its keenness to comply with international standards notably in tax matters 
and, thanks to this attitude, has made Switzerland an example in terms of corruption and 
money laundering in the eyes of the FATF’s recommendations that it has been applying 
scrupulously42. 
In addition to this “good student” image, needed in times of scandal linked to financial 
matters, Switzerland was granted the mention “Largely compliant” from the Global Forum on 
Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes on July 26, 2016 (Appendix 4), 
which is a tribute to Switzerland’s recent internal development to comply with its business 
partners to ensure financial fairness as outlined by the Federal Department of Finance led by 
Minister Ueli Maurer43. 
Despite the debates within Switzerland when it comes to international tax matters, the 
Federal Council continually shows its readiness to comply and innovate with international 
standards. It can be assumed that the experts which are part of the Federal Department of 
Finance are, like their European counterparts, willing to follow the transparency trend and 
sacrifice part of what used to be a Swiss privilege of discretion in order to avoid 
repercussions of disputes with its business partners which would surely have a dramatic 
impact on the Swiss market.  
                                               
40
 Eurobarometer of the European Parliament, 85.1: 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/20160623PVL00111/Europeans-in-2016-Perceptions-and-
expectations-fight-against-terrorism-and-radicalisation) 
41
 Credit Suisse – Worry Barometer 2015:  
http://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/index.cfm?fileid=9F4940A3-FB35-F300-
FC08DE83EB1895AF (Accessed on August 7
th
, 2016) 
42
 FF 2014 585: https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-gazette/2014/585.pdf (Accessed on August 7th, 
2016 and FF 2014 685: https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-gazette/2014/685.pdf (Accessed on 
August 7th, 2016) 
43
 Communication dated July 26th, 2016 : https://www.efd.admin.ch/efd/fr/home/dokumentation/nsb-
news_list.msg-id-62879.html (Accessed on August 7th, 2016) 
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The Swiss and their private sphere 
The protection of privacy finds its international legal roots in the Art. 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Appendix 5). In Switzerland, where the private sphere is held 
in very high esteem, it is guaranteed by the Art. 13 of the Federal Constitution (Appendix 6). 
Privacy is a very important part of the Swiss culture as outlined by Fons Trompenaars, 
consultant and reference in the field of cross-cultural communication, who identified the 
Swiss as very formal people with whom personal contact was lengthy to establish due to the 
difficulty to enter the private sphere (HAMPDEN-TURNER & TROMPENAARS, 2004). This 
need of the Swiss for their privacy is also characterised by the importance they grant to their 
financial private sphere. As mentioned earlier, the Swiss law extends the professional 
secrecy traditionally given to medical workers and attorneys-at-law to Swiss bankers through 
the Art. 47 of the Federal law on Banks (Appendix 1). 
Every two years, the association Swissbanking mandates the company M.I.S. Trend to 
survey the Swiss population about financial matters, including the importance placed on the 
financial private sphere. Among Swiss people surveyed in 201544, 85% expressed their wish 
for their financial privacy to be protected by the banks against third parties. Although showing 
that almost nine out of ten Swiss people are attached to their financial private sphere, this 
figure also illustrates a slight trend of decrease when compared to the two previous surveys. 
Indeed, in 201345, 86% of the surveyed Swiss people expressed the same wish, against 91% 
in 201146. This decrease outlines that, while being still very important to the absolute majority 
of Swiss people, they slowly begrudgingly accept less privacy, as demonstrated by the 72% 
of people surveyed who responded that they were expecting it to deteriorate in the future. 
When specifically asked about their thoughts on banking secrecy, an abrupt decrease in 
popularity is noticed: in 2011, 73% of the sample wished to maintain it, and 72% in 2013. In 
2015 however, only 41% expressed their support. The reasons for this sudden drop in 
popularity remains unclear, as the question in the survey was formulated differently. 
Nevertheless, if it keeps on going in this direction, this trend gives an idea about the 
expected chance of success of the Initiative Matter. 
According to 38% of the sample, the banking secrecy’s primary purpose is to protect the 
clients of the bank against third parties. Only 21% of them stated that it was supposed to 
protect them against the State. Considering this factor, it can be said that the trust of the 
Swiss citizens towards the State is not at stakes. Beyond, merely 8% thought that the 
banking secrecy was helping the Swiss taxpayer avoid tax. This implies that most of those 
surveyed did not find that the banking secrecy was a way for the Swiss taxpayers to hide 
assets from the tax authorities, but rather to protect privacy against unnecessary intrusion 
from third parties into their financial sphere. 
                                               
44
 M.I.S Trend : Les questions bancaires actuelles : 
 http://www.swissbanking.org/fr/asb2015_d_ext_final.pdf (Accessed on August 7th, 2016) 
45
 M.I.S Trend : Les questions bancaires actuelles : http://www.swissbanking.org/fr/20130307-5740-all-
schlussbericht-nko.pdf (Accessed on August 7th, 2016) 
46
 M.I.S Trend : Les questions bancaires actuelles : http://www.swissbanking.org/fr/20110325-5740-all-
meinungsumfrage_schlussbericht-cmo.pdf (Accessed on August 7th, 2016) 
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Taking into account the above, it seems that Swiss people overall are expecting their 
financial privacy to decrease, while still holding it in very high esteem. In parallel, their views 
towards privacy do not extend towards the maintenance of the banking secrecy, which is 
losing popularity. In addition, considering that most of the surveyed people did not see the 
professional secrecy of the banker as an opportunity to hide funds, it can be statistically 
assessed that the banking secrecy is not a sine qua non condition to guarantee the financial 
private sphere, which would still be assured without protection of the data against the State. 
Tax amnesty and tax ethics 
In order to recover hidden funds, the tax authorities, unable to request information from the 
banks, may have recourse to what is referred to as a tax amnesty. Its goal is to offer an 
incentive to taxpayers to bring hidden funds back to the surface and ensure their taxation for 
the future. 
A tax amnesty concerns the three levels of taxation (Federal, Cantonal, and Communal). It 
implies that taxpayers whom come clean do not suffer any fine for tax subtraction nor tax 
arrears. Its application is however limited in time, and its application must be voted upon by 
the people and the Canton47. The debate around the possibility for a new general tax 
amnesty is currently being held in the Parliament48. 
Since the changes brought to the Federal Law on Direct Federal Tax in 2010, a taxpayer can 
voluntary disclose financial assets previously hidden without being fined. Indeed, the 
taxpayer will only be requested to pay the tax arrears on the three last years in the case of 
an inheritance on the basis of the Art. 153a (Appendix 7) and on the last ten years in a case 
of a simple voluntary disclosure on the basis of the Art. 175 al. 3 (Appendix 8), if the three 
following conditions are met:  
1. No tax authority is aware of the tax subtraction; 
2. The taxpayer collaborates fully with the tax authority to determinate the taxable 
elements;  
3. The taxpayer endeavours to settle the related amount of tax due. 
Ever since this opportunity has been granted to Swiss taxpayers, Cantonal tax authorities 
have been swamped with voluntary disclosure requests, and almost twenty billion Swiss 
francs have emerged to the surface (BAILAT, 2015). 
Such results bring up the debate of the tax ethics: is the Swiss taxpayer dishonest? Is not 
declaring the funds in the first place a way to admit that one has been deliberately avoiding 
due taxes? For the Federal Council, certainly not in the case of inheritance. Indeed, it is not 
                                               
47
 Federal tax authorities’ history : http://www.estv2.admin.ch/jubi/steuermoral-f.htm (Accessed on 
August 12th, 2016 
48 Motion n°16.3621 : « Donner aux cantons une autonomie de procéder à une régularisation fiscale 
unique du passé : «  https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-
vista/geschaeft?AffairId=20163621 (Accessed on August 12th, 2016) 
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unusual that, without being dishonest, an heir becomes the owner of assets dissimulated 
generations ago49. 
Concerning the simple voluntary disclosure, how does one measures tax ethics and 
compliance? Economic Policy Professor at the University of Freiburg Lars Feld, determined 
that rather than weighing the complexity of a tax system and the power of its tax 
administration or the taxpayer behaviour, one can measure the taxpayer’s willingness to 
contribute towards the community’s finance by identifying the level of trust/respect a citizen 
has towards its government50. Therefore, the willingness to pay taxes expressed by a 
taxpayer in a country with high tax rates will be higher than a similar taxpayer in a country 
with lower tax rates, if the taxpayer perceives that his contributions are being reinvested for 
his and his community’s well-being. Confidence between the taxpayer and the State is 
consequently a key element to determinate tax ethics and willingness to pay tax, according 
to Lars Feld. 
When it comes to Switzerland and the question of Swiss taxpayers’ willingness to pay taxes, 
by looking only at the isolated figure of twenty billion Swiss francs recovered, one might 
conclude that Swiss people have been deliberately hiding their assets. However, one needs 
to consider the factor of Swiss taxpayer’s trust towards their government to fully address the 
question. It appears, based on the OECD’s most survey on social indicators51 that Swiss 
citizens demonstrated the highest level of trust towards their government, more than any 
other country OECD. Therefore, it can be computed that the Swiss taxpayers are the most 
willing to pay taxes in their country among all the OECD countries. 
Having that in mind, it seems that the significant amount of voluntary disclosures and the 
amount of funds recovered are not a result of a will to hide funds or to avoid tax, as Swiss 
people are keen to contribute towards a system they trust. These are the vestiges of a 
traditional financial practice that is the banking secrecy, whose purpose has been wrongly 
used in the past to secure assets in fear of political instability around Switzerland. As the 
State had and, as of today, still has no possibility to assess or track the wealth at stake, it 
remains under the discretion of the Swiss banks until the citizen is offered the chance to 
bring his assets into broad daylight. 
  
                                               
49
 FF 2006 8347 : https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/federal-gazette/2006/8347.pdf (Accessed on August 
11th, 2016) 
50
 Deterrence and Tax Morale : http://www.oecd.org/tax/administration/2789923.pdf (Accessed on 
August 6th, 2016) 
51
 OECD social indicators - Society at a glance 2014: http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/OECD2014-
SocietyAtAGlance2014.pdf (Accessed on August 8th, 2016) 
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Conclusion 
The Swiss banking secrecy, originally created to facilitate trade between two parties for 
which discretion towards third parties was a key element for business conduct, was 
subsequently misused as a way for foreign wealth to escape their tax authorities’ increasing 
need for tax revenues. 
Following the transparency trend in international finance and the increasing pressure from its 
economical partners, Switzerland has adapted its legislation to comply with the OECD 
standards, preventing foreign taxpayers from benefitting from the Swiss banks’ discretion vis-
à-vis their respective tax authorities. 
Currently, the debate about the banking secrecy is taking place in Switzerland where 
Cantonal tax authorities are still unable to access Swiss taxpayers’ banking information, 
giving them the possibility to hide funds and subtract related taxes. 
In this debate, mainly the opposing right-wing and left-wing political parties, the Swiss 
Parliament, and the Federal Council, along with the Swiss population and the influential 
economic institutions, will have a crucial role in the determination of the future of the banking 
secrecy for Swiss taxpayers. 
In a context of political uncertainty where global transparency comes at a certain cost to 
privacy, which is dear to the Swiss citizens’ heart, the future of the banking secrecy for Swiss 
taxpayers remains unclear. This professional secrecy granted to the banker in order to 
protect his clients’ financial private sphere against third parties and, consequently, against 
the State, is to evolve either by decreasing to let the tax authorities access banking 
information, or by being inscribed in the Federal Constitution. 
At a time where voluntary disclosures increase in popularity, the question of the Swiss 
taxpayer’s honesty arises. The fact that, by offering the taxpayer the chance to bring hidden 
funds to broad daylight without facing legal repercussions, the State recovers billions of 
Swiss francs that stayed for years in the shadow of the banking secrecy might direct one to 
thinking that Swiss taxpayers are deliberately subtracting due taxes, and that they only trust 
their banker to protect their private sphere. 
As outlined by Lars Feld, the taxpayers’ willingness to pay taxes and financially contribute 
towards their community is less reliant on the importance of the tax burden, than on the trust 
a citizen has towards his State. Therefore, the higher the taxpayers’ trust that their 
contribution is being fairly used, the higher their willingness to pay taxes. 
On this matter, it has been highlighted by the OECD that Switzerland benefits the highest 
level of trust from its citizens of the whole OECD members. Therefore, their willingness to 
pay taxes should reflect this level of trust. 
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If it can be presumed that the Swiss taxpayers willingness to pay taxes is the highest of all 
the OECD members, one may ask what the purpose of the banking secrecy is. Since, as 
outlined by Swissbanking’s studies, almost nine out of ten Swiss taxpayers hold their 
financial sphere in a very high esteem, but merely 8% see it as a way for Swiss taxpayers to 
hide funds from their tax authority, this demonstrates that a majority of the surveyed Swiss 
citizens trust the Swiss government when it comes to their financial private sphere and are 
not reluctant to pay their fair share of taxes. In their eyes, the banking secrecy helps protect 
their privacy vis-à-vis third parties and not vis-à-vis the State. Therefore, in the populations’ 
view, the professional secrecy of the banker to protect the financial private sphere can 
coexist with fair access granted to the tax authorities to taxpayers’ banking information. 
Having said that, the question remains, why are funds hidden in the first place and what 
should be done? 
If 8% of surveyed people are deliberately subtracting taxes from their tax authorities, they will 
permanently find ways and structures internationally to keep doing so in any tax haven that 
remains, as evidenced by the recent Panama Papers scandal. 
The remaining taxpayers, therefore around 92%, while being eager to be protected by the 
banker and the State against any intrusion in their privacy and notably the financial private 
sphere, are willing to contribute for a system in which they place trust. Although being easy 
for them to hide taxable income and wealth, any non-declared financial asset could be 
assimilated to a lack of understanding of the financial consequence that a simple omission 
can have on the whole system. 
In any case, one will need to wait the result of the Initiative Matter before speculating about 
the future of the banking secrecy for Swiss taxpayers. Whatever the decision of the Swiss 
voters, it seems however obvious that the Federal Council and the Federal Department of 
Finance carefully prepared two distinct strategies to address this issue and ensure fair 
taxation of the Swiss taxpayers’ banking assets. Either they will put back on the table the 
project of revision of the penal law in tax matters and unify the process in place for direct and 
indirect tax to access Swiss taxpayers’ financial information even in case of doubt of a simple 
subtraction, or, if the Initiative Matter is accepted by the voters, will extend the frame of the 
Swiss withholding tax to be applied to all income derived from Swiss banks’ activities. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Art. 47 Loi fédérale du 8 novembre 1934 sur les banques et les caisses 
d’épargne 
Art. 47153 (état le 1er janvier 2016) 
1 Est puni d’une peine privative de liberté de trois ans au plus ou d’une peine 
pécuniaire celui qui, intentionnellement:  
a. en sa qualité d’organe, d’employé, de mandataire ou de liquidateur 
d’une banque, ou encore d’organe ou d’employé d’une société d’audit, 
révèle un secret à lui confié ou dont il a eu connaissance en raison de 
sa charge ou de son emploi;  
b. incite autrui à violer le secret professionnel;  
c.154 révèle un secret qui lui a été confié au sens de la let. a ou exploite 
ce secret à son profit ou au profit d’un tiers.  
1bis Est puni d’une peine privative de liberté de cinq ans au plus ou d’une peine 
pécuniaire celui qui obtient pour lui-même ou pour un tiers un avantage 
pécuniaire en agissant selon l’al. 1, let. a ou c.155  
2 Si l’auteur agit par négligence, il est puni d’une amende de 250 000 francs au 
plus.  
3 …156  
4 La violation du secret professionnel demeure punissable alors même que la 
charge, l’emploi ou l’exercice de la profession a pris fin.  
5 Les dispositions de la législation fédérale et cantonale sur l’obligation de 
renseigner l’autorité et de témoigner en justice sont réservées.  
6 La poursuite et le jugement des infractions réprimées par la présente 
disposition incombent aux cantons. Les dispositions générales du code 
pénal157 sont applicables. 
Appendix 2: Art. 26 OECD Model Convention 
Art. 26 Exchange of information 
1. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall exchange such 
information as is necessary for carrying out the provisions of this Convention or 
of the domestic laws concerning taxes of every kind and description imposed on 
behalf of the Contracting States, or of their political subdivisions or local 
authorities, insofar as the taxation thereunder is not contrary to the Convention. 
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The exchange of information is not restricted by Articles 1 and 2. Any 
information received by a Contracting State shall be treated as secret in the 
same manner as information obtained under the domestic laws of that State 
and shall be disclosed only to persons or authorities (including courts and 
administrative bodies) concerned with the assessment or collection of, the 
enforcement or prosecution in respect of, or the determination of appeals in 
relation to the taxes referred to in the first sentence. Such persons or authorities 
shall use the information only for such purposes. They may disclose the 
information in public court proceedings or in judicial decisions.  
 
2. In no case shall the provisions of paragraph 1 be construed so as to impose on 
a Contracting State the obligation:  
a. to carry out administrative measures at variance with the laws and 
administrative practice of that or of the other Contracting State;  
b. to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the 
normal course of the administration of that or of the other Contracting 
State;  
c. to supply information which would disclose any trade, business, 
industrial, commercial or professional secret or trade process, or 
information, the disclosure of which would be contrary to public policy 
(ordre public).  
Appendix 3: Art. 175 and Art 186 Loi fédérale du 14 décembre 1990 sur l’impôt fédéral 
direct 
Art. 175 Soustraction consommée 
1. Le contribuable qui, intentionnellement ou par négligence, fait en sorte qu'une 
taxation ne soit pas effectuée alors qu'elle devrait l'être, ou qu'une taxation 
entrée en force soit incomplète, 
celui qui, tenu de percevoir un impôt à la source, ne le retient pas ou ne retient 
qu'un montant insuffisant, que ce soit intentionnellement ou par négligence, 
celui qui, intentionnellement ou par négligence, obtient une restitution d'impôt 
illégale ou une remise d'impôt injustifiée, 
est puni d'une amende. 
Art. 186 Usage de faux 
1. Celui qui, dans le but de commettre une soustraction d'impôt au sens des art. 
175 à 177, fait usage de titres faux, falsifiés ou inexacts quant à leur contenu, 
tels que des livres comptables, des bilans, des comptes de résultat ou des 
certificats de salaire et autres attestations de tiers dans le dessein de tromper 
l'autorité fiscale, 
sera puni de l'emprisonnement ou de l'amende jusqu'à 30 000 francs.  
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Appendix 4 : Jurisdiction ratings following a Phase 2 review 
 Source : https://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/exchange-of-information-on-
request/ratings/#d.en.342263 
 
Appendix 5 : Art. 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Art. 12: 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
Jurisdiction ratings following a Phase 2 review 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, China (People’s Republic of), Colombia, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, India, Ireland, Isle of Man, Japan, 
Korea, Lithuania, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden 
Compliant  
Albania, Argentina, Aruba, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize, 
Bermuda, Botswana, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Cameroon, 
Cayman Islands, Chile, Cook Islands, Cyprus, Czech Republic, El 
Salvador, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Gabon, 
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Gibraltar, Greece, Grenada, Guernsey, 
Hong Kong (China), Hungary, Italy, Jamaica, Jersey, Kenya, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macao (China), Malaysia, Malta, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Monaco, Montserrat, Netherlands, Nigeria, 
Niue, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, San 
Marino, Senegal, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, 
Seychelles, Switzerland, Turks and Caicos Islands, United Kingdom, 
United States, Uruguay 
Largely Compliant  
Andorra, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados*, Costa Rica 
Curaçao, Indonesia, Israel*, Samoa, Sint Maarten, Turkey, United 
Arab Emirates 
Partially Compliant  
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Appendix 6 : Art. 13 of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation 
Art. 13 Right to privacy  
1. Every person has the right to privacy in their private and family life and in their home, 
and in relation to their mail and telecommunications.  
2. Every person has the right to be protected against the misuse of their personal data. 
 
Appendix 7 : Art. 153a of the Loi fédérale du 14 décembre 1990 sur l’impôt fédéral 
direct 
Art. 153a Rappel d’impôt simplifié pour les héritiers  
1. Chacun des héritiers a droit, indépendamment des autres, au rappel d’impôt simplifié 
sur les éléments de la fortune et du revenu soustraits par le défunt, à condition:  
a. qu’aucune autorité fiscale n’ait connaissance de la soustraction d’impôt;  
b. qu’il collabore sans réserve avec l’administration pour déterminer les élé- 
ments de la fortune et du revenu soustraits;  
c. qu’il s’efforce d’acquitter le rappel d’impôt dû.  
2. Le rappel d’impôt est calculé sur les trois périodes fiscales précédant l’année du 
décès conformément aux dispositions sur la taxation ordinaire et perçu avec les 
intérêts moratoires.  
3. Le rappel d’impôt simplifié est exclu en cas de liquidation officielle de la succession 
ou de liquidation de la succession selon les règles de la faillite. 
4. L’exécuteur testamentaire ou l’administrateur de la succession peuvent également 
demander le rappel d’impôt simplifié.  
 
Appendix 8 : Art. 175 al. 3 of the Loi fédérale du 14 décembre 1990 sur l’impôt fédéral 
direct 
3. Lorsque le contribuable dénonce spontanément et pour la première fois une 
soustraction d'impôt, il est renoncé à la poursuite pénale (dénonciation spontanée 
non punissable), à condition: 
a. qu'aucune autorité fiscale n'en ait connaissance; 
b. qu'il collabore sans réserve avec l'administration pour déterminer le montant 
du rappel d'impôt; 
c. qu'il s'efforce d'acquitter le rappel d'impôt dû.1 
 
